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I. INTRODUCTION 
Herbert Hovenkamp has indisputably earned the deanship of 
contemporary antitrust scholarship. One could point to many different 
attributes by which he has earned his laurels: fantastic scholarly productivity; 
clarity and precision in the craft of writing; analytical depth in both law and 
economics; moderation in a field apt to polarization; and custodianship of 
the influential Areeda treatise.1 In this Essay, I hope to honor another 
quality that has contributed significantly to Herb’s tremendous success as an 
antitrust scholar—his engagement with history. 
Much contemporary antitrust scholarship bursts with excitement at the 
discovery of new phenomena or theories that in all actuality have long shelf 
 
              Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan. This Essay was written for a festschrift honoring Herbert 
Hovenkamp. 
        1. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of the Areeda–Hovenkamp Treatise in the Lower 
Courts and What It Means for Institutional Reform in Antitrust, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1919 (2015); 
Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
2039 (2015). 
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lives in earlier epochs in the antitrust cycle. Though antitrust scholars often 
speak as though economic analysis began with the structuralist school of the 
1950s, Herb has frequently reminded everyone that antitrust proponents 
and opponents have never faced a shortage of economic theories.2 Through 
his insights as a legal historian, Herb has helped make the antitrust 
community aware of the resonances of current debates with the debates and 
resolutions of earlier generations. 
Two years ago, Herb and I tried unsuccessfully to organize a symposium 
on the centennial anniversary of the 1912 United States presidential 
election. In this Essay, I hope to share some of the insights that we planned 
to explore in the centennial year of that momentous campaign. The 1912 
election was, by far, the most consequential for U.S. competition policy to 
date. As I shall argue, with apologies to Robert Fulghum3 and some degree 
of dramatic overstatement, all that we really need to know about antitrust 
was debated at length, by strong expositors, in 1912. Through their 
speeches, correspondence, and writings, the candidates laid out a broad 
range of positions available on the three historically persistent questions 
about antitrust policy: (1) Do we want a competitive economy or a managed 
one?; (2) Is antitrust necessary to a competitive economy?; and (3) What 
sort of institutional arrangements produce the best antitrust enforcement? 
II. 1912: A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE 
The four-way presidential race of 1912 between Woodrow Wilson, 
William Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eugene Debs was arguably the most 
melodramatic in American history. Framed around the unraveling 
friendship of Roosevelt and Taft—with Roosevelt calling Taft a “fathead” 
and “puzzlewit” and Taft calling Roosevelt a “dangerous egoist” and 
“demagogue”4—the race involved a momentous succession of dramatic and 
perilous interludes: Roosevelt was shot in the chest in Milwaukee and then 
brushed off his friends and doctors to continue giving a political speech 
before collapsing and nearly dying; Taft lost one of his closest advisers, 
Archie Butt, in the sinking of the Titanic, and then Taft’s running mate, 
 
 2. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 257, 259 (“Contrary to a common perception, the Chicago School was hardly the first time 
that United States antitrust law confronted economic theory. Antitrust in the United States has 
seldom suffered from a shortage of economic theories suggesting why certain behavior should 
be unlawful.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 1, 1–3 (Antonio Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002) (arguing that 
courts have long relied on prevailing economic theories). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Fact, Value and Theory in Antitrust Adjudication, 1987 DUKE L.J. 897 (examining various economic 
theories that have exerted a significant influence on antitrust doctrine). 
 3. See generally ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED IN 
KINDERGARTEN: UNCOMMON THOUGHTS ON COMMON THINGS (1988). 
 4. DEBORAH DAVIS, GUEST OF HONOR: BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AND 
THE WHITE HOUSE DINNER THAT SHOCKED A NATION 259 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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James Sherman, died of illness only days before the election; and just two 
days before the election, Wilson received a four-inch scalp cut in a motor 
vehicle accident.5 
But the election was significant for far more than its oversized 
characters and personal narratives. The race was momentous because of the 
vital domestic and foreign policies at stake, contestation over the role of 
state in economic and social regulation, and the fracturing of the two-party 
political system which opened the door to a far wider range of ideological 
expression than usual in the general election. Further, the fact that 
Roosevelt and Wilson (and to a lesser extent Taft) were public intellectuals 
whose rhetorical contributions came not merely in campaign speeches but 
in articles, tracts, and books makes 1912 rich fodder for examination of 
political, ideological, and legal contestations during the rise of 
Progressivism; America’s entry onto the world stage;6 and the economic, 
social, and political upheavals that would mark the 20th century. 
Antitrust policy played a critical role in the 1912 election—arguably for 
the last time. Debs, himself a victim of the assertion of antitrust law against 
the labor movement,7 argued for complete nationalization of trusts. Teddy 
Roosevelt, widely characterized as a “trustbuster” for his assertive role as 
President against J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and the other “Robber 
Barons,” was reconsidering the role of antitrust law and business regulation 
in controlling the rise of corporate power. Privately unhappy with the break-
up of Standard Oil in 1911,8 Roosevelt asserted the inevitability of the rise of 
the trusts, the foolishness of trying to break them up, and the need for 
executive branch regulatory control over large interstate corporations rather 
than through ad hoc antitrust interventions. 
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism9 gave rise to charges of socialism—a charge 
that both Roosevelt and Debs brushed off as ludicrous (although for 
different reasons).10 As for Taft, the incumbent shifted during the campaign 
 
 5. BRETT FLEHINGER, THE 1912 ELECTION AND THE POWER OF PROGRESSIVISM: A BRIEF 
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 3–4 (2003). 
 6. The turn of the 20th century saw the United States emerge as a world power, as 
highlighted, for example, by the Spanish ceding of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to 
the United States after the Spanish–American War; the American establishment of 
protectorates in Cuba and Hawaii; the global circumnavigation of the Great White Fleet; and 
Theodore Roosevelt’s winning of the Nobel Peace prize in 1906 for brokering an end to the 
Russo–Japanese War the previous year. 
 7. See United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724, 763–66 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894). 
 8. See Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur B. Farquhar (Aug. 11, 1911), 
in THEODORE ROOSEVELT: LETTERS AND SPEECHES 652, 652 (Louis Auchincloss ed., 2004) 
[hereinafter Letter from Theodore Roosevelt]. 
 9. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE NEW NATIONALISM 21–39 (William E. Leuchtenburg 
& Bernard Wishy eds., Prentice Hall, Inc. 1961) (1910). 
 10. MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, 
at 344–46 (1988). 
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toward a staunch defender of the common law, favoring courts rather than 
expert agencies and preferring a case-by-case method to decide antitrust 
cases.11 His anti-Wall Street rhetoric grew so shrill at points that the business 
elite began to wonder whether they should prefer the ostensibly conservative 
and pro-business Taft, rather than Roosevelt.12 Supported intellectually by 
Louis Brandeis, Wilson staked a ground somewhere between Roosevelt’s 
regulatory nationalism and Taft’s common-law incrementalism, stressing the 
need for antitrust reform and an expert-commission model but a continued 
place for judicial review and ultimate judicial control over antitrust law.13 
Wilson’s victory in 1912 paved the way for the 1914 reforms—the 
Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts. But the contestation of ideas 
that peaked in 1912 set the stage for continued debate about the regulation 
of competition in the New Deal, the post-War era, and for decades to follow. 
Even today, most of the big questions in antitrust policy shadow the debates 
of 1912. 
III. THE CANDIDATES ON THE BIG QUESTIONS OF COMPETITION POLICY 
At some level, all big issues of antitrust policy come down to three broad 
questions. First, do we even want a competitive economy, or is a regulated 
and managed economy preferable? Second, assuming that we want a 
competitive economy, what rule, if any, does antitrust need to play in 
securing competitive market conditions? Finally, assuming we want a 
competitive economy and believe that antitrust is necessary to promote it, 
what sort of institutional arrangements will best advance that objective? The 
candidates of 1912 did not have comprehensive or always fully consistent 
answers to each of these questions, but they succeeded in articulating a rich 
and deep range of perspectives on each of the questions. 
A. COMPETITIVE OR MANAGED ECONOMY? 
A striking and often misunderstood fact about the 1912 election is that, 
although all four major candidates generally agreed that something needed to 
be done about the trusts, only two of them—the conservative Taft and the 
progressive Wilson—thought that anything like antitrust law, as we currently 
think of it, was the solution. The two other candidates—Roosevelt and 
Debs—favored either regulation taking the place of antitrust or complete 
nationalization of industry. Thus, the question in 1912 was not merely what 
kind of antitrust law to have, but whether a competitive economy should 
exist at all. 
Roosevelt is often misunderstood as a strong proponent of antitrust. 
Certainly, his administration initiated a number of important antitrust cases, 
 
 11. Id. at 364–82. 
 12. Id. at 375. 
 13. See id. at 383–430. 
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such as actions against the Northern Securities Company, American 
Tobacco, Standard Oil, and U.S. Steel, with Roosevelt himself taking the 
lead in advocating such action to Congress.14 But even while his 
administration was bringing antitrust actions in federal court, Roosevelt was 
becoming increasingly convinced of the need for federal “supervision and 
control” over large interstate corporations,15 not efforts to disband the trusts 
or instill competitive norms. Increasingly over the first decade of the 20th 
century, Roosevelt came to the conclusion that industrial organization in 
large corporations was inevitable and permanent. Efforts to restore markets 
to classical conceptions of atomistic competition would be futile or 
destructive of society. 
As Roosevelt argued, “[b]usiness cannot be successfully conducted in 
accordance with the practices and theories of sixty years ago unless we 
abolish steam, electricity, big cities, and, in short, not only all modern 
business and modern industrial conditions, but all the modern conditions of 
our civilization.”16 The problem was not just limitations in the current text 
or judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but also that the antitrust 
approach was a fool’s errand: “The Anti-Trust Law cannot meet the whole 
situation, nor can any modification of the principle of the Anti-Trust Law 
avail to meet the whole situation.”17 As Roosevelt looked back on his 
administration’s enforcement actions after leaving the White House, he 
began to argue that the only success of the antitrust actions he had initiated 
was in teaching the captains of industry “that they were subject to the law, 
and that they would not be permitted to be a law unto themselves.”18 The 
actual relief secured was inconsequential, perhaps even counterproductive. 
By 1912, Roosevelt was staking a position against any trustbusting at all. 
Far from honoring his “trustbuster” moniker, Roosevelt argued for just the 
opposite—the legality of large combinations of capital, nonetheless subject 
to pervasive governmental regulation. In private correspondence, arguing 
against the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust, he explained his position 
succinctly: 
I do not myself see what good can come from dissolving the 
Standard Oil Company into forty separate companies, all of which 
 
 14. Special Message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the Senate and House of 
Representatives (May 4, 1906), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
69667 (last visited May 14, 2015) (detailing to Congress findings of the Bureau of Corporations 
that by “unfair or unlawful methods, [Standard Oil] crushed out home competition”). 
 15. EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 30 (2001) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Theodore 
Roosevelt) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. Theodore Roosevelt, Editorial, The Trusts, the People, and the Square Deal, OUTLOOK, 
Nov. 18, 1911, reprinted in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
SOURCES 107, 112 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013). 
 17. Id. at 111. 
 18. Id. at 110. 
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will still remain really under the same control. What we should 
have is a much stricter governmental supervision of these great 
companies, but accompanying this supervision should be a 
recognition of the fact that great combinations have come to stay 
and that we must do them scrupulous justice just as we exact 
scrupulous justice from them.19 
Debs also argued against the existing antitrust laws, calling the Sherman 
Act “silly” and “puerile” and merely a “flintlock” against the power of the 
trusts.20 For Debs, monopolistic consolidation of industrial power was 
inevitable and desirable: “Monopoly is certain and sure. It is merely a 
question of whether we will be collectively owned monopolies, for the good 
of the race, or whether they will be privately owned for the power, pleasure 
and glory of the Morgans, Rockefellers, Guggenheims and Carnegies.”21 
The socialists had long believed that the consolidation of capital might 
be strategically useful in nationalizing industry, since industries with a small 
number of firms might be easier to nationalize than industries with many 
firms.22 Debs ratified this view, urging his supporters to seize the historical 
turn toward industrial consolidation as a moment that enabled the course of 
socialism. 
Over the course of his administration, Taft underwent a transformation 
from a supporter of a federal regulation model in line with Roosevelt’s to a 
defender of an individualistic, competitive economy bolstered by aggressive, 
executive antitrust enforcement.23 Taft thus set himself against Roosevelt’s 
regulatory statism and argued for the status quo in legal frameworks and 
institutions. Taft pointed to his administration’s antitrust cases against U.S. 
Steel, American Sugar, General Electric, the meat packers, and the 
transcontinental railways as proof that the existing system was working.24 
In an October 1911 speech to the Chamber of Commerce in Pocatello, 
Idaho, entitled We Must Get Back to Competition, Taft laid out the case for a 
competitive economy administered by existing antitrust principles.25 He 
argued that the only real choices facing the country were “legitimate and 
independent” competition and socialism.26 Taft declared his favoritism for 
competition, and argued that the existing antitrust laws and precedents, 
 
 19. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, supra note 8, at 652. 
 20. FLEHINGER, supra note 5, at 54 (discussing Debs’s views on antitrust laws). 
 21. A Study of Competition, APPEAL TO REASON, May 28, 1910, at 2. 
 22. See generally Henry Rand Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1899) 
(reporting that socialists favored consolidation as a means to nationalization). 
 23. SKLAR, supra note 10, at 364–65. 
 24. Daniel Crane, Progressivism and the 1912 Election, in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION 
POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES, supra note 16, at 104, 105.  
 25. “We Must Get Back to Competition,” Declares Mr. Taft, 61 TELEPHONY 447 (1911), reprinted in 
THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES, supra note 16, at 118, 118.  
 26. Id. 
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properly interpreted and enforced, were adequate to meet the trusts. He 
noted his previous challenge to William Jennings Bryant to cite any instance 
of a combination in restraint of trade that would not be declared illegal 
under the Supreme Court’s 1911 Standard Oil27 and American Tobacco28 
decisions, and observed that his challenge had gone unanswered. Finally, 
Taft threw a sop to business, asserting that antitrust enforcement was not an 
attack on either legitimate business arrangements or a desire to make 
money, and should not become an excuse for class warfare or jealous 
intermeddling with successful businesses. Anticipating almost verbatim a 
distinction drawn by Learned Hand three decades later,29 Taft argued that 
antitrust enforcement should not turn into an attack on “wealth earned by 
thrift and gathered by foresight, attention and industry.”30 
During the election cycle, Wilson cribbed heavily on competition policy 
from his antitrust braintrust, Louis Brandeis. Drawing a contrast with the 
man most likely to beat him, Wilson argued that Roosevelt proposed “to 
‘regulate monopoly’ whereas Wilson aimed to ‘regulate competition.’”31 In 
Wilson’s view, the Rooseveltian model of direct federal regulation of 
corporations was a recipe for government-created monopoly. Wilson feared 
that direct federal regulatory power over corporations would lead to 
industrial monopolies as the corporations captured their regulators and 
turned regulation to their advantage.32 Further, Wilson distinguished 
between prohibitory regulation—for example, a law against anticompetitive 
behavior by trusts—which he found to be proper and “direct administrative 
regulation”—for example, structuring corporations to facilitate 
competition—which he equated with socialism.33 
On issues of antitrust, the principal difference between Wilson and Taft 
was seemingly over whether the existing antitrust statutes and judicial 
interpretations of them were sufficient to control anticompetitive behavior 
 
 27. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 28. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
 29. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (“A single 
producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his 
superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although 
the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the 
resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat.”). 
 30. “We Must Get Back to Competition,” Declares Mr. Taft, supra note 25, at 119. 
 31. WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 269 (1965). 
 32. Wilson’s concerns were not frivolous. Although much of the external momentum for 
direct federal control of corporations came from populist voices, much of the proposed 
legislation was shaped by corporate interests, as was the Sherman Act itself. For instance, the 
House of Morgan apparently drafted the Hepburn Bill. GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF 
CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–1916, at 134 (1963). 
 33. Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and 
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 42 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a 
discussion on Wilson’s aversion to ceding antitrust power to economic experts, see id. at 45–47. 
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by the trusts. Whereas Taft stoutly defended the Supreme Court’s Standard 
Oil decision, the 1912 Democratic Party platform lamented that the opinion 
deprived the Sherman Act “of much of its efficacy” and proposed legislation 
to “restore to the statute the strength of which it has been deprived by such 
interpretation.”34 Wilson’s argument against Taft was essentially empirical—
the Republican administrations had not sufficiently enforced the antitrust 
laws, and the federal courts, stocked with Republican appointees, had 
weakened the reach of those laws through judicial construction. 
Nonetheless, Wilson and Taft concurred in supporting an economy 
regulated through competition and the importance of antitrust in spurring 
competitive markets. 
B. HOW IMPORTANT IS ANTITRUST TO A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY? 
Only Debs seriously proposed abolishing antitrust law altogether. 
Indeed, Roosevelt envisioned radically modifying the Sherman Act in a 
stronger regulatory direction, Taft favored continuing the executive 
enforcement status quo, and Wilson favored strengthening antitrust 
enforcement through a quasi-regulatory commission. None of the 
candidates took a strongly laissez faire position on competition, as was 
characteristic of some then-existing and later ideological movements. But in 
debating questions of antitrust policy, the candidates recognized that the 
degree of antitrust protection necessary for a competitive economy was 
inextricably intertwined with other regulatory interventions and market 
conditions. In particular, the parallel issue of tariffs on foreign goods 
presented the candidates with an opportunity to explore the linkages 
between antitrust enforcement and conditions in the wider economy. 
The two central economic questions of the 1912 election were the 
continuation of tariffs on imported goods and how to respond to the 
growing power of the trusts. The politics of the tariff were as tricky as any 
other issue in the early years of the 20th century. The Republicans, 
supported by a manufacturing base in the Northeast, generally favored a 
high tariff rate, evidenced by McKinley’s campaign on increasing the tariff to 
promote local industry and the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 that boosted most 
tariff rates to the 50%-level.35 The Republican Party platform in 1908 
pledged tariff reduction, and upon assuming the presidency in 1909, Taft 
had styled himself a “tariff revisionist.”36 But in 1909, Taft signed into law 
the Payne–Aldrich tariff reform bill that lowered some tariffs modestly and 
 
 34. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS: 1840–1960, at 169 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce 
Johnson eds., 2d ed. 1961). 
 35. Tariff (Dingley) Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151; see JAMES CHACE, 1912: 
WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT & DEBS—THE ELECTION THAT CHANGED THE COUNTRY 17 (2004). 
 36. President William Taft, Address on the Tariff Law of 1909 (Nov. 17, 1909), available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/taft/speeches/speech-3781. 
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increased others.37 Taft thus angered insurgent and reformist Republicans, 
mostly from the West, who favored dramatically lowering the tariff. Taft’s 
hardening on the tariff and association with the Northeastern establishment 
wing of the party caused an early party fissure that expanded into full schism 
with Roosevelt’s nomination challenge in 1912. 
On the tariff, Roosevelt and Wilson advocated for a downward revision, 
whereas Taft essentially endorsed the status quo. Roosevelt had done 
nothing to lower tariff rates during his presidency and seemed uneager to 
commit strongly to any particular direction during the 1912 race. In his New 
Nationalism speech, he called for assignment of the matter to an expert 
commission for case-by-case decision.38 What is particularly interesting to 
antitrust policy is the degree to which the candidates linked the issues of 
trade policy and domestic antitrust law. “The tariff and the trusts” became a 
standard reference during the campaign. 
The relationship between the tariffs and the trusts was widely debated in 
the political-economy literature of the early 20th century, as many 
academics argued that high tariff levels enabled the formation and 
monopolistic preservation of the trusts by insulating them from foreign 
competition.39 For example, the Harvard economist Charles Beardsley 
argued that the trust problem was almost entirely the creation of the 1890 
Tariff Act40 (supplemented by the 1897 Tariff Act). He noted that in 1890 
there were relatively few trusts and that those that existed were weak.41 He 
showed that almost all of the powerful trusts created since then were in 
industries subject to high protective tariffs and that there were very few trusts 
in markets with low or no tariffs.42 For Beardsley, the trust problem was, at its 
core, a trade problem. 
Woodrow Wilson was the candidate that most fully articulated a theory 
on the linkage between the tariff and the trusts. Wilson largely accepted 
Beardsley’s argument when he tackled the linkage between the tariff and the 
trusts in a series of public addresses in early 1912, including a keynote 
address at Nashville entitled, The Tariff and the Trusts.43 Wilson asserted that 
 
 37. FLEHINGER, supra note 5, at 182. 
 38. Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism: Speech at Osawatomie, Kansas (Aug. 31, 
1910), in THEODORE ROOSEVELT: LETTERS AND SPEECHES, supra note 8, at 799, 806. 
 39. See generally GEORGE L. BOLEN, THE PLAIN FACTS AS TO THE TRUSTS AND THE TARIFF: 
WITH CHAPTERS ON THE RAILROAD PROBLEM AND MUNICIPAL MONOPOLIES (1902); FRANKLIN 
PIERCE, THE TARIFF AND THE TRUSTS (1909); Charles Beardsley, The Tariff and the Trusts, 15 Q.J. 
ECON. 371 (1901); F.W. Taussig, The Iron Industry in the United States, 14 Q.J. ECON. 475, 496–97 
(1900) (arguing that tariffs did not necessarily promote trusts). 
 40. See Beardsley, supra note 39, at 371. 
 41. Id. at 372–73. 
 42. Id. at 378. 
 43. Woodrow Wilson, The Tariff and the Trusts: Address Delivered at Nashville, Tennessee 
(Feb. 24, 1912), in 2 WOODROW WILSON, COLLEGE AND STATE: EDUCATIONAL, LITERARY AND 
POLITICAL PAPERS (1875–1913) 405, 405 (Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd eds., 1925) 
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the tariff issue—not antitrust legislation—was the defining issue of the 
campaign because of its relationship to the trust problem.44 Wilson then 
offered a historical perspective on the trust problem, beginning with the 
constitutional design for interstate free trade and leading up through the 
passage of protectionist tariffs. Under the original constitutional design, 
Wilson asserted the guarantee of competitive markets because of a vast free-
trade zone among the states.45 The Framers expected that “prices would be 
kept down by internal competition.”46 However, with the rise of 
industrialization in the late 19th century and the increasing turn to 
combination, “[t]he old time of individual competition is probably gone” 
and “[w]e will do business henceforth when we do it on a great and 
successful scale, by means of corporations.”47 Industrialization had brought 
about scale economies and hence a diminution in competitiveness. 
Importantly, however, many of these large combinations had already 
reached their maximum efficient scale, and any further increases would lead 
to diseconomies of scale.48 Absent the tariff, the economy would consist of 
large and efficient domestic corporations competing against large and 
efficient foreign corporations. Because of the tariff, Wilson argued that the 
trusts were insulated from foreign competition and thus effectively in a 
position of a protected monopoly. For Wilson, the key to maintaining the 
efficiencies brought about by industrialization and preserving competition 
was not so much strengthening antitrust enforcement, which he did support, 
but by opening the door to foreign competition by lowering the tariff. 
Before pressing for the antitrust reforms that would materialize in the 
Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts of 1914, Wilson secured tariff 
reductions through the Underwood Tariff Act of 191349 (in tandem with the 
introduction of the first federal income tax, made lawful by the ratification 
of the Sixteenth Amendment) to compensate for the loss of tariff revenues 
 
[hereinafter Wilson, The Tariff and the Trusts]; see also Woodrow Wilson, Efficiency: Address to 
Real-Estate Men of Boston (Jan. 27, 1912), in 2 WILSON, supra, at 354, 354 [hereinafter Wilson, 
Efficiency]; Woodrow Wilson, The Tariff: Address Before the National Democratic Club (Jan. 3, 
1912), in 2 WILSON, supra, at 325, 325 [hereinafter Wilson, The Tariff]. 
 44. Wilson, The Tariff and the Trusts, supra note 43, at 406 (“[W]e all of us agree that the 
central issue in the next campaign will probably be, as so often before, the question of the 
tariff.”); see also Wilson, Efficiency, supra note 43, at 355–56 (“Almost every time public 
questions are discussed in this day somebody asks the question: ‘What is the leading question of 
the approaching political campaign?’ Now, I don’t know what is the leading question, but I 
know what is the central question, or at least I think I do, because I find that every road leads to 
that question, and that is the question of the tariff.”). 
 45. Wilson, The Tariff, supra note 43, at 329; Wilson, The Tariff and the Trusts, supra note 
43, at 406–07. 
 46. Wilson, The Tariff, supra note 43, at 329. 
 47. Wilson, The Tariff and the Trusts, supra note 43, at 410–11 (emphasis omitted). 
 48. Wilson, The Tariff, supra note 43, at 337–38. 
 49. Tariff (Underwood Tariff) Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.). 
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and dealt a blow to the “money trust” through the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913.50 He thus ratified the claim he made during the campaign in linking 
the trusts and the tariffs. 
C. WHAT INSTITUTIONS? 
The final frontier in the candidates’ contestation, both for competition 
policy and for larger questions of democracy, concerned institutional 
arrangements. In particular, the candidates sharply clashed over the power 
of the federal courts as contrasted to the executive or legislative branches or 
the possibility of independent regulatory agencies, which were rising in the 
Progressives’ consciousness. While Debs and Roosevelt derided the courts, 
Taft rushed to their defense and Wilson—as on many issues—tried to stake 
an intermediate ground. 
On the left flank, the socialists reacted to the specter of Lochner51 and 
the use of the federal injunctive power to quash labor unions in the name of 
the Sherman Act. Sounding a radical anti-judicial note, Debs’s Socialist party 
platform called for the wholesale abolition of judicial review, the lower 
federal courts, and “the immediate curbing of the power of the courts to 
issue injunctions.”52 
To Taft’s dismay, Roosevelt joined the attack on the judiciary. 
Consistent with his “pure democracy” program first announced in February 
of 1912, Roosevelt advocated a variety of popular reforms including the 
direct party primary, the initiative referendum, less burdensome means of 
constitutional amendment, and the recall. Like Debs’s reaction to 
Lochnerism, Roosevelt laid particular emphasis on the recall of judicial 
decisions and darkly hinted that the entire concept of judicial review might 
need reconsideration. 
On antitrust, Roosevelt was harshly critical of the prevailing executive/
judicial enforcement modality, arguing that “a succession of lawsuits is 
hopeless from the standpoint of working out a permanently satisfactory 
solution.”53 Specifying an institutional framework for his new nationalism, 
Roosevelt argued in favor of a greatly expanded Bureau of Corporations 
with regulatory power over the trusts. Roosevelt desired sharp curtailing of 
judicial review of the Bureau’s decisions. 
It fell to Taft, the former judge and future Chief Justice, to ride to the 
defense of the federal judiciary and the executive mode of antitrust 
enforcement. Over the course of the campaign, Taft articulated with 
increasing urgency the defense of the constitutional order, and in particular, 
 
 50. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 51. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 52. The Socialist Party Platform of 1912, SAGE AM. HIST. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.sage 
americanhistory.net/progressive/docs/SocialistPlat1912.htm. 
 53. Roosevelt, supra note 16, at 110–11. 
A6_CRANE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/18/2015  7:26 AM 
2036 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:2025 
of the sanctity of the judiciary. “I love judges and I love courts,” he 
proclaimed. “They are my ideals on earth that typify what we shall meet . . . 
in heaven under a just God.”54 
As Marvin Sklar has written, “Wilson’s position . . . may be regarded as a 
synthesis of Roosevelt’s and Taft’s: the establishment of a federal 
administrative commission charged with policing the market against unfair 
business methods, but limited in its powers by statute and judicial review.”55 
Although a Progressive, Wilson did not share the Progressive-era infatuation 
with government by experts. Reacting to a proposed antitrust commission in 
1912, he caustically remarked: “I don’t want a smug lot of experts to sit 
down behind closed doors in Washington and play providence to me.”56 
Wilson resisted any expert commission model that would have the 
commission prospectively blessing the activities of the trusts, arguing that 
this was just an expression of Roosevelt’s model of an unholy partnership 
between the Government and the trusts. Wilson declared that although “the 
opinion of the country” supported a commission, “[i]t would not wish to see 
it empowered to make terms with monopoly or in any sort to assume control 
of business, as if the Government made itself responsible.”57 Wilson also 
insisted on a continued role for the courts in antitrust enforcement, an 
insistence that would ultimately bear fruit in the appellate review provisions 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.58 
IV. THE SHADOWS OF 1912 
The 1912 election had immediate consequences for competition policy, 
both through Wilson’s victory and through broad consensus themes that 
emerged from the candidates’ interactions. At a broad level, the election 
served to ratify regulated corporate capitalism as the primary modality of 
economic organization.59 Although Taft and Wilson thought some level of 
deconcentration was possible and Debs advocated nationalization, all of the 
candidates essentially accepted the inevitability—and perhaps the 
efficiency—of industrial organization on a large scale. Concurrently, the 
candidates all accepted that a great degree of governmental intervention—
ranging from Debs’s nationalization to Roosevelt’s heavy-handed regulation 
to Taft’s unapologetic trustbusting—was necessary for management of the 
trusts. Thus, despite the candidates’ bitter contestation on a range of issues 
concerning competition policy, the overlaps in their positions—mirroring 
 
 54. “We Must Get Back to Competition,” Declares Mr. Taft, supra note 25, at 118. 
 55. SKLAR, supra note 10, at 420.   
 56. Woodrow Wilson, A Campaign Address in Sioux City, Iowa (Sept. 17, 1912), in 25 THE 
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 148, 154 (Arthur S. Link et al. eds., 1978). 
 57. Woodrow Wilson, An Address on Antitrust Legislation to a Joint Session of Congress 
(Jan. 20, 1914), in 29 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 56, at 156. 
 58. SKLAR, supra note 10, at 325–32. 
 59. Id. at 403–08. 
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emerging national consensus—served to legitimize corporate capitalism with 
enduring effect. 
Wilson’s victory also had immediate, and to some extent enduring, 
effects on the shape of U.S. competition policy. 1913 saw immediate pushes 
for banking and tariff reform designed to increase the competitiveness of 
the U.S. economy and diminish the power of the trusts. The 1914 statutes—
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Clayton Acts—reflected the 
compromises between technocratic Progressive and conventional executive/
judicial models of antitrust that Wilson had advocated during the campaign. 
From the hindsight perspective of the subsequent century, however, the 
debates of 1912 remained alive and kicking for generations to come. The 
relationship between competition, trade policy, and conditions in the wider 
economy remained a central question, even if less cleanly articulated than by 
Wilson in 1912. The rebuilding of tariffs during the 1920s, culminating in 
the disastrous Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,60 deepened the Great 
Depression, and set the stage for the early New Deal’s experiment with 
replacing competition with regulatory management.61 The Brandeisians 
would have their revenge in the mid-New Deal era with a return to a pro-
competition policy.62 
In the post-War Era, the rise of the free trade movement allowed testing 
of the claim advanced by Wilson that the trust problem was largely a 
function of trade barriers. The Chicago School arose at a time when foreign 
competition was flooding the U.S. market as never before.63 Its generally 
laissez faire policy recommendations for antitrust resonated with realities that 
many markets were becoming intensely more competitive as a result of 
foreign entry. The automobile market, for example, went from complete 
domination and oligopolistic coordination by the Big Three to one in which 
a bevy of foreign entrants began cleaning Detroit’s clocks.64 Nonetheless, the 
case for antitrust revived as evidence mounted on the prevalence of global 
cartel agreements. As even Beardsley acknowledged decades earlier, removal 
of the protectionist tariffs “should not be regarded as the complete or final 
solution of the trust problem,” since “international competition might 
 
 60. Tariff (Smoot–Hawley) Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).  
 61. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION: 1929–1939, at 125–226 
(rev. ed. 1986). 
 62. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 37 (1995).  
 63. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
925 (1979). 
 64. A Crowded Car Industry: From Big Three to Magnificent Seven, ECONOMIST (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17902837 (noting that the Big Three were Chrysler, Ford, 
and GM). 
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sooner or later lead to international combinations.”65 And, sooner or later, it 
did. 
The institutional questions contested so fiercely in 1912 did not 
evaporate either. The courts weathered the early 20th century backlash 
against Lochnerism, Roosevelt’s later court-packing plan, and desires by 
some Progressives to replace judicial and expert management with 
technocratic administration. Although some areas of regulation moved 
much more in the Progressive-technocratic direction that Roosevelt 
advocated, antitrust did not.66 The FTC and Justice Department’s Antitrust 
Division continued to work in parallel, ultimately subject to the will of the 
courts. Then, in the post-War era, private litigation began to soar and 
eventually eclipsed the work of the agencies in driving antitrust policy. 
Dissatisfaction with the systemic effects of an antitrust system predominantly 
driven by private enforcement and Article III judges has led to renewed 
interest in technocratic solutions to antitrust problems. The debates of 1912 
have never been finally settled, and continue to pervade antitrust 
scholarship. 
V. CONCLUSION 
1912 was a magnificent year for antitrust because its prime contestants 
posed and debated so eloquently the foundational questions about a 
competition law system and its regulatory alternatives. Antitrust has 
diminished dramatically in political salience since that time; candidates for 
higher office pay it precious little attention. However, the set of questions 
posed and debated in 1912 persist to this day. Natural experimentation over 
the last century has given us more data with which to debate the questions, 
but no better framing of the questions. 
 
 
 65. Beardsley, supra note 39, at 387. 
 66. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
